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Public Housing Authorities in the Private Market
Introduction
Originally, U.S. public housing authorities (PHA) produced and managed publicly-
owned, physical affordable housing units with mostly federal support.  Today some are heavily 
engaged actively in the private housing market, using hybrid public and private strategies (Kleit 
and Page, 2015; Nguyen, Rohe, & Cowan, 2012).  To date, little is known about the extent to 
which PHAs augment their public housing and vouchers with other types of units and even less 
is known about the characteristics and environments of PHAs that own other units. Therefore, 
the goals of this paper are three-fold:  to describe (1) which PHAs are likely to engage in a mix 
of public-private strategies, (2) how many such units PHAs have produced and (3) why their 
engagement with the private housing market varies around the county.  These details are 
especially important given the increasing need for affordable housing in the context of declining 
federal resources since the 1980s and a policy environment that has pushed PHAs to work at the 
intersection of the public and private sectors. Thus, this study makes both an empirical and 
analytical contribution to the understanding of how PHAs provide affordable housing. 
This paper outlines the policy context for PHAs, expected variations in organizational 
strategy as quasi-public1 entities, and the factors that might compel them to undertake public-
private activities as a means for expanding their affordable housing stock. We hypothesize that 
small variations in their state legislative environment can facilitate increased private market 
activity. A national survey of PHAs points to a significant minority of PHAs engaging in housing 
ownership outside of the public housing stock. A content analysis of enabling legislation for 48 
states and a multivariate analysis suggest that some state and local contexts can foster PHA’s 
1 Quasi-public organizations are private corporations that have the backing of government.
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private-public strategies. Such an analysis offers insight into which contexts are conducive to 
PHAs successfully creating or preserving affordable units.
The Policy Context for PHAs
Federal resources for affordable housing have decreased since the 1980s, and policy has 
devolved to the local level. In turn, PHAs have altered their methods of housing and service 
delivery to include a mix of private and public strategies (Kleit and Page, 2015; Nguyen, Rohe, 
& Cowan, 2012).  In the 1980s, PHAs started managing tenant-based vouchers, which increased 
the scope of their activities and pushed them to interact with the private housing market. Policy 
changes since the 1990s have moved PHAs even closer to supporting affordable housing through 
market means, as public housing redevelopment through HOPE VI2 (1992-2010), a focus on 
asset-based management,3 the implementation of mixed-finance4 in 1998’s Quality Housing 
Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA), and an increased emphasis on developing affordable 
housing with the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program have all required PHAs to use 
private market strategies to finance and manage their properties. 
As a result, PHAs increasingly use public funding to leverage private investment, 
harnessing the potential of markets for the development, management, and maintenance of their 
properties (Landis and McClure, 2010). This funding strategy, in the context of reduced 
resources for public housing, has signaled a move away from publicly owned affordable housing. 
The most recent iteration of this shift is embodied in the Rental Assistance Demonstration 
2 HOPE stands for Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere.
3 In the public housing program, PHAs traditionally engaged in centralized management of their entire housing 
portfolio, with a centralized waiting list, maintenance, and property management. In 1998, QWHRA mandated 
asset-based management, moving PHAs to site-based management of public housing--managing them in parallel to 
how privately-owned affordable management is managed.  This means that public housing is managed as part of a 
portfolio of assets, with site-base waiting lists, maintenance, and property management.
4 Mixed finance is the ability for public housing authorities to use public capital funds to leverage private investment 
in housing.
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(RAD), which is facilitating the transition of public housing to private ownership. RAD is the 
result of a progression of policies that have been privatizing affordable housing (Reid, 2017), 
using private dollars to rehabilitate and retain subsidies in public housing. Thus, changes in U.S. 
housing policy since the 1980s have promoted both the private ownership of affordable housing 
and the layering of varied sources of funding and governance to create affordable housing (Vale, 
2017).  
Some PHAs are expanding their housing stock beyond government supported public 
housing for the first time, while others have owned affordable housing outside of the U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) stock for many years using funds from a 
variety of local and state sources (see, for example, Bloom, 2008; Kleit and Page, 2008, 2015).  
This flexibility in unit ownership is possible because of PHAs’ complex policy and legal 
environment. PHAs operate under federal regulation to expend federal funds but are state-
chartered, locally founded and controlled organizations. Changing mandates at federal, state, and 
local levels of government lead to great variation in how PHAs function, the types of housing 
and services they provide, and their local impact (Kleit and Page, 2008, 2015; Nguyen, et al., 
2012; Quercia and Galster, 1997). 
PHAs as Public Organizations Responding to Ambiguous Policy Mandates
Devolved and ambiguous policy mandates ask public housing authorities to engage the 
private market to build, renovate, or purchase affordable housing; the result is great variation in 
service delivery, that PHAs’ internal organizational characteristics and external contexts shape.  
Ambiguity for public agencies, like PHAs, arises from two sources: (1) the multiple levels of 
government that signal policy direction (Cho, Kelleher, Wright, & Yackee, 2005) and (2) 
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legislation that contains “fuzzy terms”(Chun and Rainey, 2005, p. 3) without specificity in either 
the end objectives or the means for achieving those objectives (Moore, 1995). 
Conflict occurs when a policy contains multiple mandates to achieve competing goals. 
For example, a PHA looking to refinance and renovate public housing using mixed finance may 
have multiple mandates that include attracting capital through investors who expect a profit 
while continuing to serve the poorest households who may not be able to pay sufficient rent to 
support a financial return.  Ambiguity and conflict create uncertainty, and public organizations 
have to make decisions about priorities and courses of action (Cho, et al., 2005). Uncertainty can 
also hinder performance (Meyers, Riccucci, & Lurie, 2001) and provide a flexible space for 
experimentation and innovation (Moore, 1995). Given the dynamics of policy ambiguity and 
conflict, outcomes vary.  With new policy mandates, PHAs that innovate take on programs and 
responsibilities that diverge from long-term activities and expectations.  Owning and developing 
rental housing outside of the traditional HUD-assisted stock is the form of innovation we 
examine in this paper, and whose numbers are typically unknown. 
Figure 1 illustrates what we mean by “housing outside of the traditional HUD-assisted 
stock.” The vertical axis represents the amount of Fair Market Rent (FMR)5 landlords receive; 
those on the top row receive full FMR (or more) and landlords in the bottom row receive less 
than FMR. The horizontal axis depicts the public subsidy status; the left column includes 
programs that involve a government supply or demand side subsidy while those on the right 
operate without a public subsidy.  
[Figure 1 ABOUT HERE]
5 HUD sets the FMR for a given metropolitan housing market annually, usually at the 40th percentile rent of the 
housing stock for a given size unit, although some flexibility exists in small market areas or expensive markets.
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Cells I, III, and IV contain affordable housing with and without public subsidy. Landlords 
in these three cells receive rents that could be above or below the FMT. Units in Cell 1 are at or 
above the FMR with government subsidies. Residents in these units pay a fraction of their 
incomes (usually 30%), the subsidy comprises the rest of the rent up to the FMR, and the 
resident also pays the amount over the FMR.  These programs include housing vouchers such as 
Housing Choice Vouchers (HCV, formerly Section 8) and some state and local programs. Cell 
III units are also subsidized, but the total rent the landlord receives is below FMR.  These include 
public housing, HCV used in below-FMR units, affordable-unit-set-asides in the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit Program (LIHTC) (Burge, 2011; Freddie Mac, 2018),6 and some state and 
local programs. Units in Cell IV are also below FMR, but not due to public subsidies; instead 
these are units at the low end of the market, often called “naturally occurring affordable 
housing.”  While some of this housing may be in sub-par conditions, some of it may simply be 
old, but well maintained.  Lastly, Cell II contains market-rate rental units, with rents that are at or 
above FMR, and have no public subsidies.  
While funding agencies count units in Cells I and III, no centralized, official counts of 
those in Cells II and IV exist, which is one of the motives for undertaking this research.  In this 
paper, “hard units” refer to a physical housing unit that has a stable subsidy with a private or 
public owner.  “Soft units” refer to housing units where the subsidy is unstable or moveable, 
such as the HCV program. Either could be in Cells I, III, or IV.
Public housing authorities have historically provided housing in Cell III.  In the 1970s, 
many PHAs began managing housing in Cell I, and as they innovate, may now be creating 
housing in Cells I, III and IV.  Sometimes they also develop housing in Cell II.  The choice of 
6 The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) is managed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury.  It provides 
tax credits that are allocated by state housing finance agencies to housing development projects.  It is the largest 
affordable housing construction program in the U.S., and has been in place since 1987.
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whether to develop new rental housing and the mix of public subsidies and rents reflects a 
response to conflicting and ambiguous policy mandates from various levels of government. The 
results may depend upon the organization’s internal characteristics and the external state and 
local environments.   
Innovation, Hybridity, and External Pressures 
Whether PHAs engage in innovative ownership depends in part on their organizational 
characteristics. Hybridity— the adoption of activities or organizational forms that cross sectors— 
is one factor that can contribute to housing innovation. Hybrid organizations are mission-driven 
and have characteristics of public, nonprofit, and private sector organizations (Billis 2010, 
Hoffman and Badiane 2012, Nguyen et al. 2012, Smith and Skelcher 2014, Skelcher and Smith 
2015).  
Much of what we know about hybridity in housing entities comes from Europe, where 
social housing organizations have similarly begun to privatize ownership and depend more on 
market dynamics to provide housing (Czischke et al. 2012, Mullins et al. 2012).  Czischke et al. 
(2012) argue that in Europe, social housing organizations are beginning to act like social 
enterprises.  They conceptualize social enterprises as hybrid entities of varying legal forms that 
act in accordance to the competing interests of public, market, and community forces and values. 
This stance at the nexus of these rival interests causes them to take actions that may be 
entrepreneurial rather than “bureaucratic,” (Czischke et al. 2012, 428) and “conflicts between 
principles are played out in organizational strategies and day-to-day decisions” (Czischke et al. 
2012, 428).   
While European social housing organizations are private entities and most authors 
discuss non-profit or third-sector organizations becoming hybrids (Billis 2010, Smith and 
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Skelcher 2014), in the U.S. quasi-public PHAs are also becoming hybrids as they employ private 
sector methods and financing to meet their public missions (Nguyen et al. 2012). The 
underfunding of public housing has meant that PHAs can only create new housing opportunities 
when they essentially act as hybrid organizations, entrepreneurially seeking out new funding 
streams and modes of operation to support affordable housing. PHAs that embrace hybridity 
have a range of flexibility that enables them to interact with and utilize the private market, 
collaborate with and tap into the skills of a variety of organizations, rank priorities and goals, and 
access a larger range of resources (Kleit, Forthcoming; Nguyen, et al., 2012).
In addition to hybridity, other PHA characteristics can foster innovation.  First, 
experience and resources within government organizations influence housing innovation at the 
state and local levels. For example, governments that have raised revenues and developed 
programs are more likely to implement innovative strategies in the future (Stegman and Holden, 
1987). Second, organizations that have more experienced leaders and staff are more likely to 
produce innovative housing programs (Basolo and Scally, 2008). Higher executive pay may 
reflect the cost of such experience. Third, an abundance of slack resources, which includes an 
excess of financial capital and personnel, may allow for more innovative housing programs 
(Basolo and Scally, 2008) except concerning the establishment of trust funds (Scally, 2012).  
External state and local environments can also exert pressure on PHAs and influence 
their activities.  Among local housing organizations, external factors influencing housing 
innovation include public perception and opinion, local economic and social conditions, local 
political culture, party politics, and the presence of interest groups (Basolo and Scally, 2008; 
Yerena, 2015). State and local governments are more likely to implement innovative policies, 
such as housing trust funds (HTFs) and housing assistance programs, when there is a perceived 
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affordable housing crisis (Aiken and Alford, 1970; Basolo and Scally, 2008; Scally, 2012; 
Stegman and Holden, 1987). State and local governments that emphasize public-private 
partnerships have a more extensive history of housing policy innovation (Stegman and Holden, 
1987). States and localities with liberal constituencies and politicians are more likely to employ 
innovative strategies (Aiken and Alford, 1970; Basolo and Scally, 2008; Mueller and Schwartz, 
2008). Governments under the control of a single political party are more likely to innovate, 
especially when the executive and legislative branches of government are unified under the same 
party (Basolo and Scally, 2008). Places with politically involved residents also have a greater 
frequency of implementing innovative housing programs (Aiken and Alford, 1970). 
Pressure from affordable housing advocacy groups can lead to greater housing innovation 
within a policy network because these co-operative arrangements lead to resource and 
information sharing (Provan and Milward, 2001). For example, New Jersey advocacy groups 
suggested many housing programs implemented in the state (Basolo and Scally, 2008). In 
another case in Phoenix, the network of affordable housing organizations including housing 
agencies and advocacy organizations led to more productive discussions with city officials on 
regulatory barriers to the production of affordable housing (Lucio and De la Cruz, 2012). In 
contrast, activity among homebuilder and real estate interest groups blocks innovation, especially 
inhibiting the establishment of HTFs (Connerly, 1993).
Finally, the rate of local or state growth affects the resources available for innovative 
programs. Because programs often use tax revenues as the primary funding stream, areas with 
greater growth are more likely to have the resources to implement housing programs (Connerly, 
1993; Mueller and Schwartz, 2008; Scally, 2012). HTFs are more common in high-growth states, 
where development fees provide a steady, dedicated funding source. Without sufficient tax 
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revenue and funding sources, state and local governments do not have adequate resources to 
promote housing innovations (Mueller and Schwartz, 2008). Examples include: Florida and 
Oregon with $7,658,020 and $5,538,901 in HTF funds, respectively (U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, 2018). Innovation is also more likely to occur in older and 
larger cities (Aiken and Alford, 1970).
PHAs’ External Organizational Environment: State Enabling Legislation 
State enabling legislation, which provides the legal framework to create PHAs and 
delineates their powers, may be an additional factor within the environment shaping variation in 
PHA’s housing production (Kleit and Page, 2015). Restrictions or flexibility in state enabling 
legislation can impact activity and innovation at the local level more generally (Reese and 
Malmer, 1994). Housing authorities are not entities of the federal government; local governments 
create them under state law. 
According to our review of enabling legislation in the 48 contiguous United States, the 
legislation follows the same outline and contains the same content; small variations may create 
variations in strategy. All states have language authorizing basic PHA powers, including the 
ability to acquire, rent, and sell properties. Yet, differences between states exist; these include the 
ability to bond-finance housing, determine tenant selection preferences, prioritize geographic 
service areas, and form affiliate organizations. Such differences have created a range of PHA 
types and activities, which, in turn, influence their ability to produce affordable housing using 
hybrid methods.  For example, most states allow PHAs to issue their own bonds. Iowa is an 
exception, with the municipality rather than the PHA issuing bonds ("Iowa Municipal Housing 
Projects," 2017). And while most states enable PHAs to engage in partnerships, Illinois specifies 
that PHAs can work with for-profit entities for the purpose of developing, redeveloping, or 
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owning “low-income and mixed-income rental and for-sale housing as a partner or member of a 
partnership, limited liability company, or joint venture” ("Illinois Housing Authorities Act," 
2008). In Oklahoma, PHAs must hold a public hearing before starting a project with more than 
20 new housing units ("Oklahoma Public Health and Safety," 2017), potentially hindering 
housing production.
Research Strategy and Data
To describe PHAs’ production of housing units (both affordable and not), we relied on a 
combination of results from a survey of PHA directors and publicly available data on PHAs’ 
housing stock. Much organizational information is available from HUD.  We supplemented 
HUD’s organizational information with that from a wide variety of sources to operationalize the 
internal and external operating environments of PHAs.  Using this combination of sources, we 
then examined potential sampling bias and developed zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) 
models to predict the number of units PHAs own outside the HUD public housing stock. The 
ZINB model accounts for the high proportion of PHAs that do not own any units outside of the 
public housing stock.  
Survey of Public Housing Authority Directors
We surveyed all PHA directors listed in HUD’s 2009-2012 Picture of Subsidized 
Households and the Public Housing Director’s Association’s (PHADA) membership list 
(acquired through an agreement with PHADA). We used Dillman’s (2009) method for online 
surveys, sending an initial email invitation with follow-up reminders every two weeks. PHADA 
members also received an introductory email from the organization. The survey took place 
between December 2013 and May 2015. Out of 3,933 active PHAs, and we received responses 
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from 1,059 for a response rate of 27%. Please the Appendix for a detailed discussion of survey 
sampling.
[Table 1 ABOUT HERE]
Dependent Variable: Ownership Outside of the Public Housing Stock among PHAs
Using public information, we are able to characterize those PHAs who responded to the 
survey and those who did not.  In profile, survey respondents had a more diverse HUD housing 
portfolio than those who did not respond (Table 1). Responding PHAs were more likely to 
manage vouchers (62 percent, compared to 51 percent for non-respondents) and more likely to 
own public housing units (86 percent, compared to 75 percent). A greater percentage of 
responding PHAs (48 percent) manage vouchers and own public housing simultaneously than 
non-respondents (32 percent). Owning public housing units and managing a diverse portfolio 
may be an indication of a PHA’s experience and comfort with owning hard units; PHAs that 
already own hard units may be more likely to develop or redevelop.  Notably, about 4 percent of 
all housing authorities do not manage vouchers or own public housing; these agencies were less 
likely to respond to the survey—6 percent of non-respondents neither managed vouchers nor 
owned public housing.
[Table 2 ABOUT HERE]
Research suggests that PHAs can be path dependent on previous practices, and the 
purchase or development of units represents a novel approach (Kleit and Page, 2008).  Although 
developing units is likely a more innovative action than simply owning units, it is difficult to find 
out who developed the units.  Furthermore, few PHAs act as their own developer, often taking 
ownership or management of turn-key properties. Some PHAs purchase and redevelop existing 
properties. To address housing need, a typical non-profit sector response is to hold units for the 
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long run to maintain their affordability. For these reasons, we focus on the ownership of units 
outside of the Public Housing and Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) programs (Table 2).
Given the nature of the survey and the focus of the research, the sample over-represents 
PHAs who own housing outside of the HUD public housing stock. The NHPD, the only 
available data source for non-respondents, provides supplementary estimates of the number of 
units PHAs own. According to the survey and NHPD, 919 PHAs own units outside of the public 
housing program. A significantly higher proportion of respondents own such units.  They own 
111,655 of the total estimated 150,886 non-public housing hard units. Just under half (44 
percent) of responding PHAs owned such units, compared to 16 percent of non-respondents.  
The responding PHA with the most hard-units outside of public housing owned 7,000 (2,816 
among non-respondents). In our sample, 464 PHAs own such housing, with an average of 241 
units. Thus, the NHPD vastly underestimates the number of units owned outside of public 
housing, likely because it documents units from a limited number of funding sources (Table 2). 
The survey data provide the best estimate for such units, but due to the nature of the data sources, 
the survey sample unsurprisingly contains a high proportion of PHAs that own or develop units.
The survey also provided a unique picture of PHAs’ ownership and development 
practices. While these PHAs own about 111,655 units, they report having developed or 
redeveloped 126,651 housing units, either within or outside of the HUD stock using mixed-
finance, federal programs like LIHTC, state or local funding. Approximately one-third of 
respondents reported owning units that currently have no subsidy of any kind, amounting to 
45,520 unsubsidized units. Some PHAs have engaged in development since the 1930s under 
state or local programs, but the majority of our survey respondents first began developing units 
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in the 1990s and 2000s, suggesting that changes in housing mandates that began in the 1990s are 
initiating new development processes at the local level. 
Additionally, in the process of identifying the extent of the PHA universe, we discovered 
168 PHAs that are not in HUD’s on-line systems. These PHAs have never operated under 
HUD’s jurisdiction. Instead, they are the product of state and local policies. Some of these PHAs 
have developed or acquired units through funding sources such as state housing programs.
[Table 3 ABOUT HERE]
PHAs’ internal organizational attributes
We included four concepts related to internal organizational factors that may influence 
PHA’s ownership of non-public housing units. First, as proxies for a PHA’s internal capacity to 
own and manage physical housing units, we use PHA size (calculated based on the number of 
voucher and public housing units in their portfolios), executive director compensation, and a 
binary variable indicating whether their HUD-assisted portfolio includes public housing units. 
The executive compensation amount also serves as an indicator of staff professionalization, 
ability to attract strong leadership, and financial resources available. 
Second, PHAs with a history of innovation may be more likely to develop housing units 
because these programs provide experience and are typically granted to high-performing 
agencies. Participation in these programs also suggests that the agency is open to new ideas. We 
operationalized an agency’s history of innovation by flagging their involvement in any 
demonstration or federal grant for local improvements in housing programs. This measure 
captures whether a PHA participated in Moving to Work (MTW), Choice Neighborhoods, or the 
Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities Program (EZ/EC). 
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Third, operating at a larger geographic level could allow PHAs to access more resources 
and work across political boundaries, ultimately providing greater capacity. The majority of 
PHAs operate at the municipal level, but some PHAs serve a county, region, multiple cities, or a 
combined city and county. Between 2005 and 2014, 207 housing authorities transferred units to 
another PHA. HUD’s records for these unit transfers suggest that some PHAs are operating on an 
increasingly regional scale to maintain fiscal solvency and reduce administrative burdens. One 
example of this phenomenon is occurring in the Los Angeles area where five municipal PHAs 
have transferred their units to the Los Angeles County Housing Authority. We determined PHA 
scale based on survey responses and the PHA name. In this analysis, when concepts concern the 
local service area, we use these categories as the geographic bounds for those data.
Finally, measures of hybridity fostering organizational structures come from our Survey 
of Public Housing Authorities (PHA Survey), where each indicated if it has an affiliate or 
subsidiary organization that develops or owns housing as part of the PHA’s mission. About 30% 
of the PHA’s in our sample have a subsidiary or affiliate organization that owns and/or develops 
housing on behalf of the PHA in fulfillment of its central mission (Table 3). We also asked if the 
PHA is an independent organization, meaning that it is not integrated with local or county 
government. About 15% of PHAs in our sample are not stand-alone agencies but function as a 
part of a government agency, such as a city or county housing and community development 
division (Table 3). The Housing Authority of the City of Keyser in West Virginia is one example 
of an integrated agency. The presence of an affiliate suggests that the agency has a hybrid 
structure while integration with local government suggests that a PHA operates with added 
powers of local government (Kleit, Forthcoming; Nguyen, et al., 2012). Alternatively, 
integration with local government could mean more oversight and less market activity. 
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[Table 4 ABOUT HERE]
Enabling Legislation as an External Environmental Factor
One of our key interests is whether enabling legislation plays a role in the activities of 
PHAs because it provides the basic framework of powers and limitations in which PHAs operate. 
Content coding the state enabling legislation for the 48 continental U.S. states (Kleit, 
Forthcoming) allows us to identify nine elements of enabling legislation that corresponded with 
factors discussed in the organizational theory and housing innovation literature. These elements 
capture the policy constraints and flexibility that can influence a PHA’s organizational stance 
(Table 4). The coding is binary and denotes whether the legislation explicitly grants a given 
power. For example, the legislation contains information about PHAs’ organizational structures 
and powers. It also defines the target population that the PHA may house (e.g., low-income 
population or percentage requirement for a range of income categories). Some states allow PHAs 
to cooperate with for-profit and non-profit organizations, form regional or county housing 
authorities, and utilize special development powers. Housing projects can sometimes include 
community or commercial facilities. PHA commissioners in some states can be compensated or 
simultaneously serve as an elected official of the county or municipality. These differences in 
state legislation can provide the tools and flexibility for innovative development.  Most states 
allow county and regional PHAs to develop projects that include community facilities, the 
appointment of commissioners by a mayor or executive of a governing body, and the origination 
of bonds for sale.  
[Table 5 ABOUT HERE]
 Other External Environmental Factors Influencing PHA Activities
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We operationalize other external factors that the organizational literature suggests might 
influence PHA activities and innovation. The factors correspond to state or local levels of 
government (Table 5).  
A more liberal or progressive political climate may be conducive to housing innovation 
(Aiken and Alford, 1970; Basolo and Scally, 2008; Mueller and Schwartz, 2008). First, at the 
state level, Gallup’s (2013) State of the States results are the basis for the conservative advantage 
score. This score is the difference in the percentage of people identifying as Republican or 
leaning Republican and the percentage who identify as Democrat or leaning Democratic; a 
negative conservative advantage score indicates that the state is primarily Democratic. Second, 
Sharp’s (2005) Unconventional Political Climate Index measures the local political climate. The 
index includes the number of women in the work force, adults with a college or graduate 
education, same-sex couples, unmarried families with children, adults engaged in skilled 
occupations, and households reporting religious adherence. The data come from the 2010 five-
year American Community Survey Estimates (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010) as well as the 2010 
Religious Congregations and Membership Study (Association of Statisticians of American 
Religious Bodies, 2010). The indicators are converted to z-scores and then summed into an 
index. A higher index score represents a more progressive political climate. A third element of 
the political climate is the degree of governmental fragmentation for the jurisdiction in which the 
PHA functions. More jurisdictions within a service area represent greater government 
bureaucracy, a potential requirement for coordination across municipalities, and the potential to 
have to make payments in lieu of taxes to a greater number of governments. Thus, we include the 
number of incorporated jurisdictions, taken from the U.S. Census’ Tiger/Line files (2010 
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Tiger/Line shapefiles (machine-readable datafiles), 2010), contained within the PHA’s service 
area.
The presence of local and state housing assistance programs may suggest an environment 
that supports innovation in housing production programs (Connerly, 1993; Mueller and 
Schwartz, 2008; Scally, 2012; Stegman and Holden, 1987). Using the National Low Income 
Housing Coalition’s (NLIHC) database of rental housing programs (National Low Income 
Housing Coalition, 2015), we use the count of capital and housing production funding and 
tenant-based rental assistance programs at the state level and a binary variable for local 
jurisdictions with an assistance program (they were rare, so a count did not make sense). At the 
time of analysis, there were 173 active capital and production programs and 163 rental assistance 
programs at the state or local level.  A separate measure is an indicator of whether the state HTF 
has a dedicated funding source. This measure is based upon the Center for Community Change’s 
(2013) database of state HTFs.
Advocacy may also increase the probability of innovation (Basolo and Scally, 2008; 
Lucio and De la Cruz, 2012; Provan and Milward, 2001).  At the state level, we measured 
affordable housing advocacy as the count of how many NLIHC advocacy partners were in a 
state. At the local level, we used an advocacy organization (AO) index for housing organizations 
(Yerena, 2015). The AO index uses data from the National Center for Charitable Statistic’s 2008 
Business Master File (National Center for Charitable Statistics, No Date), using IRS information 
on all 501(c)(3) and (4) organizations categorized under the L-housing and shelter sub-group. 
From this dataset we obtained two variables: 1) a financial strength index and 2) mean age of 
AOs in the MSA. Following Yerena (2015), we created the financial strength index using 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA); the index is thus composed of the sum of the weighted z-
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scores of the total income, assets and number of organizations in the local service area. A high 
index score therefore reflects a greater potential for local affordable housing advocacy 
organizations to fill housing needs within a PHA’s housing market. 
Having a stronger tax base and a stronger housing market may influence the propensity 
for housing production and innovation (Stegman and Holden, 1987), both of which we represent 
with the number of housing units built from 2000-2010 and the percent growth in housing units 
from 1970-2010 at the state and local levels, using data from Geolytics (No Date). We include an 
interaction term for these variables, as PHAs may be influenced by a combination of both past 
and current trends. We also include the property tax per capita (in thousands of dollars) for the 
PHA service area, calculated from Data-Planet Statistical Datasets (2012). Second, states with 
more resources are more likely to have a state HTF with a dedicated source (Connerly, 1993; 
Mueller and Schwartz, 2008; Scally, 2012), included among measures of support for innovation.
Public perception, opinion and involvement may also influence innovation (Basolo and 
Scally, 2008).  We measured state-level public involvement through voter turnout in 2012 (U.S. 
Elections Project, 2012). 
More housing may be produced if there is a perceived housing crisis (Aiken and Alford, 
1970; Basolo and Scally, 2008; Scally, 2012; Stegman and Holden, 1987). In this work, we 
indicate the housing crisis as housing problems, including cost burden, incomplete facilities, or 
overcrowding in 2012. A household is housing cost burdened if more than 30% of its income is 
dedicated to housing expenses. Incomplete facilities indicate that the housing unit lacks a kitchen 
or adequate plumbing. The Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS) data (U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2011) include Census and American 
Community Survey (ACS) tabulations to identify housing problems. CHAS data shows the 
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number of very low-income households that experience the three housing problems. Places with 
greater proportions of housing problems likely have a shortage of decent, affordable housing.
Additionally, to control for other influences, we included local jurisdictional 
characteristics, including the year the jurisdiction was founded ("Columbia Gazetteer of the 
World Online," 2014), segregation measures, racial composition, and average household income 
(Geolytics, No Date). We include percentage point change variables for the last three variables to 
capture the dynamic nature of local environments. We include interaction terms of the static and 
dynamic variable for each control. We also include regional fixed effects with indicators of HUD 
Regions to address any other omitted regional factors. 
Modeling
To model the number of physical non-public housing units that each PHA owns, we used 
zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) models. The ZINB model estimates two parts 
simultaneously: a logit and a negative binomial regression. The logit predicts the occurrence of 
excess zeroes while the negative binomial predicts the number of non-public housing units that a 
PHA owns. This model was appropriate for the data because there is a high percentage of zeroes 
in the outcome variable (Hilbe, 2011); only 44 percent of our survey sample indicated that they 
owned non-public housing units. Additionally, we found that negative binomial modeling was 
appropriate for the count portion. We first modeled the count data using Poisson regression. 
However, the Cameron-Trivedi test for dispersion (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990) indicated that 
the data were overdispersed (z=3.6, p-value=0.00 for Model 4), violating the assumptions of the 
Poisson distribution. The negative binomial count model accounts for this overdispersion. 
 [Table 6 ABOUT HERE]
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Due to the iterative nature of our data collection, our sample potentially exhibits selection 
bias. To assess the impact of sampling bias on our modeling, we used PHA characteristics to 
develop inverse probability weights of responding to the survey. We compared weighted and 
unweighted models, considering the significance levels of variables, the directions of coefficient 
signs, the percent of cases accurately predicted, and model fit. Based on these parameters, we 
concluded that the weighted and unweighted samples produced similar results. Thus, the sample 
is fairly representative of the PHA universe, and the unweighted models provide better 
predictions of unit ownership. We therefore proceeded with unweighted ZINB models. 
Our three models start with a constrained model (Model 1) that predicts the number of 
non-federal public housing units with internal organizational characteristics, the external 
operating environment for PHAs, and state fixed effects.  We then omit state fixed effects and 
add state-level variables of interest (Model 2). The next model incorporates elements of the state 
enabling legislation to the model (Model 3) to see how legislation influences the number of units 
owned.  Finally, to account for elements of the environment for which we cannot control, we 
then add fixed effects representing the HUD region for each PHA (Model 4). We use robust 
standard errors for each model to account for clustering at the state level and the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) to compare the fit of the models with the lowest AIC 
representing the best fitting model.
Results
The survey results on their own suggest that PHAs are producing a substantial number of 
units outside of the traditional public housing stock, which is a meaningful contribution to 
affordable housing production amidst a resource-poor federal policy environment. The units 
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PHAs develop ensure the continued existence of affordable, hard housing units while enabling 
PHAs to serve varied populations and meet locally specific housing needs.
Multivariate models offer evidence of why PHAs may own other housing, and why they 
may produce the quantities they do. The ZINB models highlight factors that influence these 
innovative responses. The logistic portion of the ZINB model identifies significant predictors of 
whether a PHA owns non-public housing units (Table 6). This portion of the model predicts 
excess zeroes, so negative coefficients are related to a higher probability of owning non-public 
housing units. The count portion indicates how each variable impacts the number of units a PHA 
owns (Table 7).
[Table 6 ABOUT HERE]
Organizational attributes influence both the probability of owning other units as well as 
how many.  PHAs that are independent of local government offices are significantly more likely 
to own units outside of the traditional stock (Table 6). Integration with local government could 
indicate political oversight and control that stifles innovation or creative thinking about housing 
provision. Larger PHAs and those that also own public housing are more likely to own units 
outside of the traditional stock, suggesting that these PHAs have organizational capacity and 
experience with managing physical units. Larger PHAs also own more units (Table 7), which 
again is likely a function of the increased capacity and budgets that these organizations have. The 
interaction term between PHAs that have no public housing in their portfolio and PHA size is 
also significant in the logit portion of all models. When PHAs have public housing and are 
larger, they are more likely to own units. Though PHAs that own units outside of public housing 
tend to have affiliate organizations, the variable is not significant when controlling for PHA size 
and portfolio composition in any of the models. Similarly, most PHAs in our sample that have 
previous experience with demonstration programs own units outside of public housing, but this 
22
variable was not a significant predictor of housing ownership when controlling for other 
organizational characteristics.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
The environmental attributes do not predict whether a PHA owns housing units outside of 
the traditional subsidized stock (Table 6) but are associated with how many such units a PHA 
owns (Table 7). PHAs that operate in local service areas with a higher unconventional political 
climate score own more units on average; the political climate score operationalizes a more 
progressive area. Responding to local housing needs, PHAs in places that have a higher share of 
very low-income renters living in overcrowded conditions also own more units. Additionally, 
PHAs appear to respond to demographic changes and the level of segregation in their service 
area. Service areas that are becoming more racially diverse with increasing shares of black 
residents from 1990-2010 are associated with PHAs owning more units. The interaction term 
between black population change and the share of black residents in 2010 is also significant in 
two of the four models, indicating that higher shares of black residents in 2010 slightly decreases 
the positive effect of black population change on unit ownership. PHAs in places with black-
white segregation and with increasing Hispanic-white dissimilarity index scores are associated 
with greater unit ownership. The interaction term for the Hispanic-white dissimilarity variable is 
significant and negative; higher Hispanic-white dissimilarity reduces the effect of increasing 
segregation on unit ownership.
At the state level, none of the variables is consistently significant across all models and 
only one has significance in any model. In Model 4, which is the best fitting model, PHAs 
located in states with a trust fund that has a dedicated funding source have higher unit ownership. 
23
State trust funds provide valuable financial support for affordable housing development and may 
be a crucial source of gap financing for housing authorities.
State enabling legislation results suggest constraints and flexibilities that can lead PHAs 
to produce other units. In Model 4, states that allow consolidated PHAs are associated with a 
significantly higher likelihood of owning units outside of the public housing stock. PHAs that 
join together either organizationally or for certain projects may be increasing their capacity and 
tapping into a larger pool of resources. Additionally, when the jurisdictional governing body 
issues bonds on behalf of the PHA, PHAs are more likely to own units outside of the public 
housing stock. While this is counterintuitive, an entity of local government may be more 
successful at raising bond financing than a housing authority. However, the governing body 
issuing bonds is associated with lower unit counts. In states where PHAs are allowed to serve 
higher-income residents and prioritize serving elderly households, PHAs are also more likely to 
own units, though this effect is only significant in Model 3. 
The ability to create or work with an affiliate organization is positively related with a 
higher number of units owned, though the result is insignificant. When the subsidiary can be for 
profit, PHAs own less housing on average (Table 7). The reason for this relationship is unclear, 
but it may be that ownership of housing developed with a for-profit entity transfers to another 
organization and is not included in the dependent count variable.  It may also be that the 
partnership only produces housing when profit is made; it is notoriously difficult to produce 
housing affordability and take profits, thus limiting the production of units. The results indicate 
that the state enabling legislation can influence local PHA operations, although perhaps 
differently than we anticipated.
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In sum, the multivariate models suggest that PHAs’ organizational attributes may predict 
whether they own other units, but their legislative and political environments influence how 
many. Many of the theoretically proposed variables do not have a significant impact on the odds 
of owning non-federal public housing units. However, integration with local government and 
state and local environmental variables are consistently significant. When PHAs operate in a 
progressive environment and as independent organizations, they may have greater support for 
affordable housing creation. Larger PHAs, which tend to have larger staffs and budgets, have 
greater capacity for owning and producing a diverse housing stock. The external policy 
environment influences hybrid activities, exhibited in the ability to create an affiliate 
organization or the ability to bond finance without jurisdictional approval, thus enabling PHAs to 
undertake affordable housing ownership and development. PHAs with these abilities can access 
more resources, employ a variety of strategies, and act outside the bounds of local political 
oversight. Enabling legislation, in part, controls factors that influence hybridity. Thus, the 
devolved policy environment and state-level enabling legislation influence how PHAs plan for 
housing at the local level. 
Conclusions and Implications 
This research lends new insight into PHAs as local actors operating within a complex 
policy environment that expects them to employ both public and private sector behaviors to meet 
their missions in a context of increasing need for affordable housing. We estimate that PHAs 
own more than 150,000 units of housing outside of the traditional HUD-assisted stock, and as 
policy continues on its current path, this resource could grow.  However, state and local 
environments influence what PHAs do to meet local housing needs.  To enable PHAs to 
effectively plan for housing, states and local governments should allow PHAs to form affiliate 
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organizations, remove obstructive political oversight, and keep them separate from local 
government structures.  These actions may require amendments to state enabling legislation. 
Local governments and PHAs should also be mindful of the racial composition of their service 
areas and actively work to maintain fair housing opportunities. Finally, state and local production 
programs could more effectively support PHAs and provide the resources needed to acquire and 
maintain affordable housing, taking advantage of their relative flexibility.  At the same time, it is 
important to recognize that the sample represents those PHAs who are successfully developing 
housing, which our sample over-represents.  Less successful PHAs may need other sorts of 
supports.
Modeling has its limits; some factors influencing PHA ownership are likely not included 
in our framework. PHAs face many unique challenges and local variations that the current 
literature does not reflect. Historical relationships and local politics likely play a large role in 
their behavior.  Additionally, the data from the survey may be biased because PHAs that own 
and develop units may be more likely to want to share their innovations by responding. Thus, the 
results may be more generalizable to PHAs that engage in these activities, rather than all PHAs, 
though sample weighting procedures suggest this is a minimal concern. 
Future research should focus on more in-depth case studies that examine how PHAs 
develop or acquire units, why they undertake these activities, and what they do with the 
additional units. The case studies will provide a nuanced understanding of the organizational 
attributes and resources needed to support PHAs as hybrid deliverers of housing services.  Such 
information will also suggest a more nuanced typology of possible hybrid activities that PHAs 
can employ and their impact on organizational capacity.  
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Public and hybrid service delivery are only as good as the people and institutions 
implementing them; it is possible to have effective or ineffectual public or hybrid service 
delivery. This paper is an important prelude to work that looks at the relative effectiveness of 
hybrid versus public service delivery. We also still need to know the prevalence of the adoption 
of hybridization. Finally, future research should assess whether hybridization produces a market-
driven approach that that fails to provide housing to the poorest of the poor. Alternatively, 
hybridization may provide for the experience to successfully use RAD-- a public-private mix of 
resources in an effort to retain and refurbish hard units of assisted housing. It may be that PHAs 
with a history of hybrid activities are more successful at using RAD.
While HUD programs provide housing opportunities for many low-income households, 
only a quarter of those who qualify for subsidies actually get them. PHAs with affordable 
housing that is subsidized through different programs or is completely unsubsidized may have 
greater flexibility in whom they serve and how they manage their communities. With 
unsubsidized housing units, PHAs can serve a diversity of income groups and foster mixed 
income communities. Additionally, PHAs with other units may be able to provide a housing 
ladder for lower-income residents or offer units at the FMR to voucher holders. As residents 
exceed the maximum allowable income for public housing, they could move to units within the 
PHA’s stock, helping subsidized renters for an additional period before they enter the private 
rental market. Thus, housing units outside of the public housing stock have the potential to 
provide greater affordable opportunities for a variety of households. 
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 Appendix: Sampling Method
To create a complete list of PHAs nationally, we began with HUD’s 2009-2012 Picture 
of Subsidized Households as the core of our dataset. While this dataset provides information 
about the number of public housing and voucher units that a PHA owns or manages, it does not 
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provide information about programs such as Section 202, Section 811, or LIHTC housing units. 
Therefore, we supplemented The Picture with data from the 2014 National Housing Preservation 
Database (NHPD). The preservation database lists housing sites with any federal subsidy, 
including units that PHAs have developed using Section 8 project-based programs, LIHTC, 
HOME, and Rural Housing Section 515. We filtered the owner information to develop a list of 
all housing authorities in the NHPD, removing Indian authorities from the final list. This resulted 
in the addition of 151 PHAs to our dataset that do not appear in the Picture of Subsidized 
Households. When we queried HUD about these PHAs, we learned that these PHAs either 
operate independently from HUD or no longer have any vouchers or public housing.
To gain information about unsubsidized housing that PHAs might own and other 
programs that PHAs use to fund development, we conducted two surveys. The first survey 
sample consisted of 1,894 members of the Public Housing Authorities Directors Association 
(PHADA) representing PHAs of varying sizes. PHADA members received by email a link to a 
web survey asking about their development activities and sources of funding for development. 
We implemented the survey between December 2013 and January 2014 using the Dillman 
Tailored Design Method (Dillman, 2009). The director of PHADA sent an introductory e-mail to 
all members, briefly explaining the purpose of the research and encouraging members to 
participate. We distributed the survey one week later and sent two reminders in two-week 
increments. 462 PHAs directors responded with information on the development in which their 
PHAs are involved, a response rate of 24%. In the process of receiving survey responses, we 
learned that many executive directors represent multiple PHAs. In these cases, we combined the 
information for all of the PHAs that they represent and considered these PHAs to be functioning 
as one cohesive organization.
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Because our survey response set comprised only 10% of the full PHA population, we 
conducted a second supplemental survey to capture more responses. We developed an e-mail list 
of all PHAs using publicly available contact addresses through HUD’s website and sent the 
survey to PHAs that did not respond to or receive the first survey distribution. Additionally, we 
sent a condensed survey to previous respondents to ensure that our data were accurate and up-to-
date. This supplemental survey was implemented in May 2015 using the Dillman method 
described above. The supplemental survey, distributed to 3,011 PHAs, resulted in an additional 
597 responses. After assessing the information available and the survey responses received, we 
removed 142 cases from the dataset. These cases appear to be inactive PHAs and non-profit 
organizations or community action agencies that operate within a different legislative 
environment. After removing cases and combining survey results, we had 1,059 responses out of 
3,933 active PHAs, bringing the total response rate to 27%. 

Table 1. Types of federally subsidized units that PHAs own or manage by survey response status
 All PHAs PHAsresponding
PHAs not 
responding
N 3,933 1,059 2,874
PHA manages vouchers 54% 62% ^ 51% *
Number of vouchers PHA manages
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 98,810 47,430 42,200
Mean 530 619 558
Median 50 116 25
Total 2,086,082 655,377
    
PHA owns public housing 78% 86% ^ 75% *
Number of public housing units PHA owns
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 177,200 6,921 177,200
Mean 278 300 270
Median 70 105 58
Total 1,093,995 317,621  
   
PHA manages vouchers but does not own public housing 18% 14% ^ 19% *
PHA owns public housing but does not manage  
vouchers 41% 38% ^ 43%
*
PHA manages vouchers and owns public housing 37% 48% ^ 32% *
PHA does not manage vouchers or own public housing 4% 0.3% ^ 6%









Own housing? 919 23% 464 44% 455 16%
Count of non-public 
housing units
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 7,227 7,227 2,816
Mean 49 106 19
Median 0 0 0
Total 150,886 111,655 39,231











Capacity PHA size (HUD size category based on 
combined count of public housing and vouchers) 2.9 3.4 2.5
PHA does not own public housing (1=Yes) 14% 11% 16%




Participation in demonstration program or 
federal grant for local improvements in housing, 
including Moving to Work, HOPE VI, Choice 
Neighborhoods, Moving to Opportunity, 





County PHA (1=Yes) 17% 22% 13%
City-county PHA (1=Yes) 2% 2% 1%
Multi-county PHA (1=Yes) 2% 2% 2%
Multi-city PHA (1=Yes) 2% 2% 2%





PHA has an affiliate or subsidiary organization 
(1=Yes) 30% 50% 14%
PHA is independent org. from local government 
(1=Yes) 79% 88% 71%
Table 4.  Organizational Attributes:  State Enabling Legislation Elements 

















Consolidated (combine or cooperate 
with other HAs) 19 45 48 43
Allowable 
included uses
Community facilities 44 93 96 90
Commercial properties 25 67 68 66
Affiliated 
organization
Create or work with organization 29 72 70 74
Affiliate can be for-profit 22 59 55 63
Commissioner
s
Commissioners can be compensated 16 35 33 36
Commissioner can be employees or 
officers of governing body 14 34 33 35
Raising funds Governing body issues bonds, not HA 5 7 5 9
Approval Projects require permission from 
governing body or hold public hearing 
prior to undertaking project
20 47 47 47
Population 
targets
Allow higher or moderate income 
residents 27 62 65 59
Rural preference 19 43 43 43
Elderly preference 18 36 41 32
Persons with disabilities preference 13 22 25 20
Veteran/military preference 23 59 63 56













State Conservative advantage score 18 16 19
Local Unconventional Political Climate Index 0.03 0.16 -0.07
United government: Number of incorporated jurisdictions within PHA’s 




State State housing assistance program (1=Yes) (%) 1 or 2 36 31 39
3+ 63 67 60
Housing trust fund that has dedicated funding source (1=Yes) (%) 89 89 89




State National Low Income Housing Coalition advocacy partners 
in state (1=Yes) (%)
1 47 51 45
2+ 42 43 40
Local Advocacy organization index 1.1 1.4 1.0
Availability of 
tax dollars
State Number of housing units built (1,000s)* 2000-2010 514 518 511
1980-2010 -27 -30 -24
Local Number of housing units built (1,000s)* 2000-2010 62 80 48
Growth in housing units built (%) 1980-2010 -30 -28 -31
Property tax per capita  ($1,000s) 0.96 0.61 1.24
Public 
involvement




Local Very low income renter households experiencing housing-
cost burden (%)
2011 93 96 91
Very low income renters living in incomplete facilities  (%) 2011 4 4 4
Very low income renters living in overcrowded housing (%) 2011 6 7 6
Local controls Local Average income ($1,000s) 2010 61.1 64.4 58.5
Change in income (%) 1990-2010 88 87 88
Renters who are very low income (%) 2010 20.9 20.2 21.5
Rental vacancy (%) 2010 11.1 10.6 11.4
Change in rental vacancy (%) 1990-2010 0.7 0.4 0.8
Black population (%) 2010 10.7 10.3 11.0
Year jurisdiction founded (1=Yes) Pre-1800 8.0 11.6 5.1
1800-1899 74.0 72.6 75.2
1900-pres. 17.9 15.7 19.7
Jurisdictions in service area 2015 3.9 4.9 3.1
Change in black population (%) 1990-2010 0.8 0.9 0.7
Hispanic/Latino population (%) 2010 9.6 10.6 8.9
Change in Hispanic/Latino population (%) 1990-2010 4.6 5.0 4.2
Black-white dissimilarity index 2010 0.52 0.52 0.48
Black-white dissimilarity index change 1990-2010 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
Hispanic/Latino-white dissimilarity index 2010 0.39 0.41 0.38
Hispanic/Latino-white dissimilarity index change 1990-2010 0.02 0.02 0.02
Table 6.  Zero-inflated negative binomial model results (part 1)
predicting PHA unit ownership outside of public housing, 
logistic (binary) portion predicting excess zeroes (n=1,059)






Constant 3.06 ** 3.76 *** 3.65 *** 5.21 ***
(1.10) (0.83) (1.02) (1.24)
Internal characteristics
PHA size -0.43 *** 0.38 *** -0.44 *** -0.44 ***
(0.70) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
PHA has no public housing -1.91 ** 1.61 ** -1.42 * -1.53 *
(0.22) (0.54) (0.59) (0.66)
PHA is independent org -0.75 *** 0.85 *** -0.80 *** -0.74 ***
(0.34) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21)
PHA executive compensation (scaled) -0.55 0.27 -0.30 -0.42
(0.56) (0.29) (0.29) (0.33)
Participated in at least 1 demonstration 
program
-0.75 0.48 -0.61 -0.66
(0.63) (0.49) (0.53) (0.53)
PHA size*compensation 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.01
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
PHA size*PHA has no public housing 0.90 *** 0.69 *** 0.69 *** 0.78 ***
(0.22) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21)
Local environment
Unconventional political climate index score -0.16 0.32 -0.29 -0.14
(0.25) (0.21) (0.23) (0.24)
Advocacy organization index -0.04 0.04 0.01 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Average income 2010 (scaled) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Property tax per capita -0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Black-white dissimilarity index 2010 -0.87 0.27 -0.69 -0.67
(0.68) (0.54) (0.60) (0.66)
Hispanic-white dissimilarity index 2010 -0.01 0.49 0.44 -0.13
(0.85) (0.71) (0.76) (0.81)
Percent very low-income renters with cost 
burden
-0.95 0.71 -1.00 -0.86
(0.11) (0.57) (0.59) (0.61)
State environment
At least 1 active state capital program – 0.00 -0.02 -0.10 *
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05)
Percent growth in housing units built 1980-
2010
– 0.00 0.00 0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)





Consolidated PHAs allowed – – -0.27 -0.75 **
(0.22) (0.27)
Community facilities allowed – – 0.15 -0.60
(0.49) (0.56)
Commercial properties allowed – – 0.04 0.03
(0.25) (0.29)
Can create or work with org – – 0.60 0.24
(0.37) (0.42)
Affiliate organization can be for-profit – – 0.39 0.38
(0.36) (0.45)
Commissioners can be compensated – – 0.21 0.36
(0.23) (0.26)
Commissioners can be employees of 
jurisdiction
– – -0.11 0.49
(0.24) (0.33)
Governing body issues bonds – – 0.20 -1.21 *
(0.35) (0.49)
Project requires aproval – – 0.21 0.02
(0.20) (0.26)
Allow higher-income residents – – -0.66 -0.25
(0.23) (0.29)
Rural preference – – -0.37 -0.58
(0.26) (0.42)
Elderly preference – – -0.54 -0.32
(0.27) (0.33)
Persons with disabilities preference – – -0.19 0.00
(0.33) (0.44)
Veteran/military preference – – -0.23 -0.44
(0.19) (0.25)
HUD Regionsa
New England – – – 0.29
(0.74)
New York-New Jersey – – – 0.74
(0.67)
Mid-Atlantic – – – -0.44
(0.42)
Southeastern – – – 0.61
(0.40)
Midwest – – – -1.10 *
(0.56)
Plains States – – – -0.07
(0.50)
West – – – -2.93 ***
(0.55)
Southwest – – – 1.05
(1.01)
Northwest – – – -2.13 *
(1.01)
Log Likelihood -3,182  -3,278  -3,242  -3,205
Degrees of Freedom 153 73 102 120
Vuong z 11.7 10.4 10.2 11.9
Prob. >z 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AIC 6,670  6,701  6,688  6,649
Table 7.  Zero-inflated negative binomial model results (Part 2)
predicting PHA unit ownership outside public housing
negative binomial (continuous) portion of the modelling (n=464)
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Concept/Variable (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
(S.E.)
Constant 0.70 1.43 1.38 0.21(1.36) (1.47) (1.53) (1.95)
Internal characteristics
PHA is independent org 0.26 0.25 0.29 0.26
(0.21) (0.23) (0.21) (0.22)
PHA has no public housing -1.02 0.04 -0.78 -0.62
(0.52) (0.47) (0.52) (0.53)
PHA size category 0.17 * 0.33 *** 0.22 ** 0.20 **
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
PHA executive compensation (scaled) 0.11 0.23 0.11 0.16
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
Participated in at least 1 demonstration program -0.11 0.34 -0.21 -0.16
(0.21) (0.25) (0.22) (0.21)
Affiliate org develops/owns housing 0.19 0.09 0.07 0.11
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
County PHAa 0.37 . 0.20 0.16 0.26
(0.21) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20)
City-County PHAa 0.11 0.04 0.25 0.29
(0.29) (0.33) (0.36) (0.32)
Multi-county PHAa 0.98 * 0.61 0.88 0.82
(0.48) (0.43) (0.51) (0.46)
Multi-city PHAa -0.35 0.22 -0.48 -0.36
(0.32) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33)
PHA size*compensation 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
PHA has no public housing*PHA size 0.51 ** 0.20 0.40 * 0.37 *
(0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Local environment
Unconventional Political Climate Index score 0.43 * 0.24 0.41 * 0.44 **
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17)
Advocacy organization index 0.01 0.000 0.004 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average income 2010 (scaled) 0.21 0.57 0.33 0.36
(0.31) (0.51) (0.38) (0.37)
Property tax per capita -0.04 0.03 -0.05 * -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Black-white dissimilarity index 2010 -0.00 0.01 ** -0.00 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hispanic-white dissimilarity index 2010 -0.04 0.16 -0.08 -0.14
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Percent very low-income renters with cost burden 0.003 0.03 0.001 0.002
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Percent very low-income renters with incomplete 
facilities
-1.15 0.54 -0.97 -1.13
(1.38) (1.44) (1.25) (1.29)
Percent very low-income renters with overcrowding 2.11 * 2.31 * 2.54 ** 2.26 *
(0.94) (0.98) (0.92) (0.94)
Percent of renters that are very low-income 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Percentage point change in rental vacancy 1990-2010 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Percent rental vacancy 2010 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Table 7 continued
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Concept/Variable (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Percent change in average income 1990-2010 0.01 0.01 * 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Average income 2010 (scaled) -0.36 0.62 -0.12 -0.14
(0.69) (0.52) (0.59) (0.60)
Jurisdiction founded before 1800 -0.09 0.04 -0.22 -0.18
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.26)
Jurisdiction founded 1800-1899 0.16 0.24 0.13 0.10
(0.17) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18)
Number of incorporated jurisdictions in service area 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Percentage point change in black population 1990-2010 0.24 *** 0.19 ** 0.14 * 0.19 **
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Percent black population 2010 -0.01 0.01 -0.004 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Percentage point change in Hispanic population 1990-
2010
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Percent Hispanic population 2010 0.0004 0.01 0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Black-white dissimilarity index change 1990-2010 -0.49 0.17 -0.58 -0.51
(0.97) (0.63) (0.89) (0.85)
Black-white dissimilarity index 2010 1.03 0.94 1.62 * 1.37 *
(0.65) (0.60) (0.67) (0.69)
Hispanic-white dissimilarity index change 1990-2010 2.55 3.88 ** 4.24 ** 3.21
(1.84) (1.46) (1.60) (1.64)
Hispanic-white dissimilarity index 2010 -0.37 0.49 -1.53 -0.81
(0.86) (0.71) (0.82) (0.87)
Housing growth*units built -0.002 0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Rental vacancy change*rental vacancy 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average income change*average income 0.002 0.01 -0.00 0.001
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Black population change*black population share -0.00 ** 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 *
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Hispanic population change*Hispanic population share -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Black-white dissimilarity index change*black-white 
dissimilarity index
-2.30 2.73 -2.57 -1.89
(2.06) (1.58) (1.80) (1.74)
Hispanic-white dissimilarity index change*Hispanic-
white dissimilarity index
-5.47 7.13 ** -6.90 ** -5.30
(3.19) (2.34) (2.64) (2.87)
Percent very low-income renters with incomplete 
facilities
-1.15 0.54 -0.97 -1.13
(1.38) (1.44) (1.25) (1.29)
State environment
Conservative advantage score – 0.01 -0.004 -0.01(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
1 or 2 state capital programs – 0.04 -0.65 -0.80(0.03) (0.63) (0.67)
3 or more state capital programs – 0.24 -0.72 -0.98(0.27) (0.61) (0.76)
Trust fund with a revenue source – 0.42 0.68 . 1.27 *(0.30) (0.38) (0.54)
1 NLIHC state partner – 0.46 * -0.01 -0.38(0.23) (0.27) (0.31)
2 or more NLIHC state partners – 0.19 0.17 0.10(0.25) (0.25) (0.28)
Housing units built 2000-2010 (scaled) – 0.03 0.0002 -0.16(0.17) (0.24) (0.33)
Percent growth in housing units built 1980-2010 – 0.01 . 0.004 -0.001(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Percent voter turnout 2012 – 0.02 -0.01 0.01(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Housing growth*state units built – 0.01 0.004 -0.001(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
State Enabling legislation
Consolidated PHAs allowed – – -0.03 0.08(0.22) (0.29)
Community facilities allowed – – 0.53 0.78(0.44) (0.51)
Commercial properties allowed – – 0.20 0.33(0.22) (0.25)
Can create or work with org – – 0.59 0.56(0.40) (0.47)
Affiliate organization can be for-profit – – -0.82 * -0.86 *(0.34) (0.36)
Commissioners can be compensated – – -0.03 -0.10(0.21) (0.23)
Commissioners can be employees of jurisdiction – – -0.27 -0.49(0.21) (0.26)
Governing body issues bonds – – -0.37 -0.79 *(0.29) (0.40)
Project requires approval – – 0.32 0.01(0.21) (0.23)
Allow higher-income residents – – -0.02 -0.17(0.20) (0.29)
Rural preference – – 0.24 0.43(0.20) (0.23)
Elderly preference – – -0.16 -0.50 .(0.20) (0.29)
Persons with disabilities preference – – 0.22 0.15(0.31) (0.44)
Veteran/military preference – – 0.11 0.01(0.23) (0.25)
HUD Regionsa
New England – – – -0.59(0.82)
New York-New Jersey – – – -0.41(0.79)
Mid-Atlantic – – – -1.27 *(0.51)
Southeastern – – – -0.89 *(0.41)
Midwest – – – -0.38(0.56)
Plains States – – – 0.29(0.51)
West – – – -0.43(0.47)
Southwest – – – 0.02(1.07)
Northwest
– – – -0.20
(0.61)
Theta -0.13 . -0.27 *** -0.21 ** -0.18 *
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Log Likelihood -3,182  -3,278
 -3,242  -3,205
Degrees of Freedom 153 73 102 120
Vuong Z 11.7 10.4 10.2 11.9
Prob. >Z 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AIC 6,670  6,701  6,688  6,649
Note:  Model 1 includes state fixed effects; Model 2 and 3 omit them. Model 3 includes HUD Region fixed effects but not 
shown. *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
a Reference category is city service area.
